One of the important elements of the CARICOM community idea is a commitment to enhance foreign policy coordination (emphasis added). See Articles 6 and 16 of the amended Treaty of Chaguaramas.
On many issues, CARICOM has been successful in presenting a common foreign policy positions to the world. However, in a community of 15 Member States, this has sometimes proven difficult to deliver. For a good discussion of the CARICOM experience with foreign policy coordination see this excellent article by Alica Nichols of Caribbean Trade Law and Development:
See also the article by Elizabeth Morgan: Foreign policy in CARICOM – principled or transactional?
For its part, the Canada-CARICOM Strategic Partnership makes general commitments to foreign policy coordination as well. The Partnership commits to a permanent joint mechanism for regular dialogue, as well as for ad hoc consultations on issues of mutual interest and joint action on shared priorities (emphasis added).
Althought the Canada-CARICOM Strategic Partnership is not yet one year old, there has been little evidence to date that this new partnership has resulted in coordinated action in the area of foreign policy.
Governments wishing to have closer relations with each other are correct in seeking greater coordination of foreign policy. However, until all other elements of public policy for which they are responsible converge to concensus positions, they are also wise to not make this an absolute commitment.
Recent CARICOM Statements on Venezuela: a case in point
The recent elections in Venezuela present an interesting case study of how difficult foreign policy coordination can be for organizations and partnerships and how nuanced various national positions can be.
While much of the world has condemned the Venezuelan election as rigged in favour of the Maduro government, and deplored the crackdown on opposition supporters since, a number of different perspectives have been revealed within CARICOM.
At a July 30 press conference that closed a CARICOM summit, CARICOM’s current chair, Grenada Prime Minister Dickon Mitchell, said the organization was not obligated to comment on Venezuela’s “domestic matters,” but expected that its member states would communicate individual positions.
“Caricom does not have to have a position on the matter. Elections in Venezuela are domestic matters. Second Venezuela is not a member of Caricom and third, we expect and it has already happened that members will indicate their positions. Caricom noted the fact that the elections had taken place, we’re happy the people had opportunity to exercise their democratic right to engage in elections and there is no division within Caricom on the issue.”
Source: Mitchell: No division in Caricom on Venezuela elections – Trinidad Guardian
However, even during this meeting it became apparent that this CARICOM (non?)position was not sufficient for some. Prime Ministers Ralph Gonsalves of St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Roosevelt Skerrit of Dominica endorsed the official result and extended congratulations to Maduro, with Gonsalves urging the group to follow suit. Both countries are also members of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America-People’s Trade Treaty (ALBA-TCP)—a group of left-wing Latin American countries that includes Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela as well as six CARICOM nations. ALBA-TCP issued a congratulatory statement to Maduro the morning after the election.
“Congratulations to president Nicolás Maduro on his re-election to the presidency of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. The Venezuelan people have spoken in a free, fair and democratic process,” said Dr Gonsalves.
The Prime Ministers of Saint Lucia and Trinidad and Tobago both cautiously acknowledged the electoral result.
For it’s part, the government of Guyana, currently in a territorial dispute with Venezuela, issued a statement on July 30 supporting calls for a “transparent process of verification of the will of the Venezuelan people.”
In the OAS a vote shortly after the election revealed more differences of view and nuance. The resolution sought to call on the National Electoral Council of Venezuela to publish immediately the voting results for each polling station from Sunday’s elections and for the conducting of a comprehensive verification of results in the presence of observers. The resolution also sought to recognize the fundamental right of people to demonstrate without suffering reprisals and the preservation of all electoral equipment. The vote saw 4 CARICOM countries vote in favour, abstentions from 7 CARICOM countries and 3 absences.
Of the CARICOM countries, Guyana voted in favour. Also supporting the resolution were Haiti, Jamaica and Suriname. Abstentions among CARICOM countries were The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, St Kitts-Nevis, St Lucia and Antigua and Barbuda. Even more revealing were the absentees: Dominica, St Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago.
Source: OAS resolution on Venezuela reveals deep divide in CARICOM – Stabroek News
And on August 5, 2024, the OECS Heads of Government released a formal statement supportive of Venezuela which they described as a Congratulatory Communique.
A further position, in complete opposition to the OECS statemente above, was revealed when Guyana and Suriname signed on to a Joint Statement (supported by 22 countries including Canada) calling for democracy in Venezuela. And the lack of full CARICOM support appears to have created some hard feelings.
Guyana’s Foreign Secretary, Robert Persaud, in re-posting the statement on his Facebook page, remarked that “Democracy will triumph, and those states, including Caribbean leftists which seek to justify rigging, must decide which side of history they want to be on.”
What is Canada saying?
Canada, for its part, has shared views on the Venezuela election as well. These have tended to focus on i) concern that the announced results to not align with evidence of the will of the Venezuelan people ii) lack of published electoral data iii) human rights violations faced by opposition supporters iv) the forced departure from Venezuela of Opposition Leader Edmundo González Urrutia and the revocation of protected status of the Argentinian Embassy where a number of opposition figures have taken refuge.
Canada’s position on Venezuela is not without its critics at home.
And it does not seem to have won much support with CARICOM, at least in the public domain. With the exception of the International Joint Statement with 22 signatories (but only Guyana, and Suriname from CARICOM) there is not much “coordination” evident vis a vis Venezuela. Indeed, the only public comment from a CARICOM member on Canada’s position has been a a negative one.
Prime Minister Keith Rowley, in a separate statement, issued an ominous warning that interference by “outsiders” in Venezuela who may want a different election outcome, were basically asking for trouble.
“When the United States, Canada and the European Union decided to change the Government in Venezuela by force, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, Mexico, Uruguay all took objection because a bad situation was about to get worse. “We believe . . . that any attempt to forcibly change the Government of Venezuela by outsiders is asking for trouble, yet unknown . . .,” said Rowley who was speaking during a meeting of the ruling People’s National Movement and reported by the Caribbean Media Corporation (CMC).
Foreign policy coordination within CARICOM and between Canada and CARICOM is going to be difficult at times
The reluctance of OECS (Organization of Eastern Caribbean States) countries to criticize Venezuela can be attributed to several factors:
- Economic Ties: Venezuela has provided significant economic assistance to many OECS countries, particularly through initiatives like Petrocaribe, which offers oil at preferential rates. This economic support has fostered a sense of loyalty and gratitude.
- Diplomatic Relations: The longstanding diplomatic relationships between Venezuela and OECS countries have created a foundation of mutual respect and cooperation. Criticizing Venezuela could strain these relationships and potentially jeopardize future cooperation.
- Regional Solidarity: OECS countries often emphasize regional solidarity and non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations. This principle is a cornerstone of their foreign policy, making them less likely to publicly criticize a neighboring country.
- Political Considerations: Some OECS leaders may share ideological affinities with the Venezuelan government or may be cautious about aligning too closely with Western criticisms of Venezuela, which they might perceive as politically motivated.
The position of Guyana and Suriname is also reasonably easy to understand. Both share borders with Venezuela and are both nervous of Venezuela’s territorial expansion ambitions. This, and a desire to keep a united front with the U.S. and others in their resitance to Venezuelan expansion, explains their clear position opposing Venezuela’s election results.
For the rest, abstaining, or being absent, from resolutions or delarations regarding the situation in Venezuela can be explained by not wanting to be directly involved in a messy situation with a stronger neighbour and justified by CARICOMs long-standing position not to interfere in internal matters of other countries.
CARICOM, and the Canada-CARICOM Strategic Partnership will tend to find it easier to coordinate on foreign policy issues that are more abstract than specific; more multilateral than individual state-focussed; and on issues where there is sufficient “strength in numbers” to be able to participate without standing out. And most importantly it will be found on issues of mutual interest or shared priorities. Venezuela is clearly not one of those issues.